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The last few years have been witness to a revival in discussions of the relation between democratic theory and pluralism. The context of this 
revival is a complex and overdetermined questioning of our contemporary 
situation, marked by a simultaneous problematization and celebration of lib­
eral democracy in the wake of the collapse of alternative social imaginaries 
since the events o f 1989. On a politico-cultural level, this has engendered a 
vociferous debate concerning the presumed universality of liberal democracy 
and its ability to deliver equality to all, regardless of difference, whether the 
latter is thought in gender, racial, cultural or sexual terms. The subversion of 
the homogenising and totalising myths structuring modernity informing theo­
ries of democracy, has reopened the conceptualisation of the nature and 
character of democracy itself.
In this context I would like to engage in an excavating excercise in order to 
investigate to what extent problems addressed today under the rubric of 
»multiculturalism« are congruent with those addressed in »plural society« 
theories. This investigation takes as its starting-point the assumption that there 
is a need to break down the perceived conceptual dichotomy between so-called 
western, advanced capitalist societies, and the »third world« as well as the 
conceptual primacy given to the former. The aim here is to investigate what we 
can learn from the theorisation o f »plural societies« in a reconsideration of our 
contemporary condition and to draw out a set o f consequences for the discus­
sions o f pluralism, toleration and the limits of liberal democracy.
The multiculturalist challenge
Multiculturalism -  occupying a space similar to much feminist theorisation of 
the twentieth century 1 -  in its questioning of the universalism of liberal 
democratic orders, has tended to re-centre theoretical discussion around the
i . It has to be pointed out immediately that these are issues which are more than familiar to 
debates within feminist theory. The recent multi-cultural inflection o f  this debate, can in one 
sense be seen as yet another vindication o f  certain feminist criticisms o f the presumed 
universality o f  liberal democratic values. For a discussion o f  the question in the context o f  
feminist debates, see Anne Phillips (1993).
F il. vest./Acta Phil., XIV (2/1993), 121-139.
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interrelated questions of pluralism, tolerance and democracy. The central 
demand of multiculturalists is for the recognition o f distinct cultural identities 
of members of a pluralistic society in the public domain. At stake here is the 
opposition between a politics o f universalism and a politics o f difference, 
where the former emphasizes the equal dignity of all citizens, and fights for 
forms of nondiscrimination that are »blind« to the ways in which citizens 
differ, and the latter involves a redefinition o f nondiscrimination as requiring 
that we make these distinctions the basis o f differential treatment (Taylor 
1992,39). While the politics of difference inevitably involves a detour through 
a universalist argument -  everyone should be recognised for his or her unique 
identity -  the demand is not for an ‘identical basket o f rights and immunities’, 
but for the recognition of the unique identity o f this individual or group 
(Taylor 1992,38). It thus asks that we give acknowledgement and status to 
something which is not universally shared. In contrast to the universalist ideal, 
the politics o f difference aims not to bring us to a »difference-blind« social 
space, but on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now, 
but forever (Taylor 1992,40).2 O f course, this demand springs from, or reas­
serts itself against a dominant or hegemonic order or culture who claims to 
represent a putative universal. It involves thus, not only the demand for 
recognition of difference, but also a rejection o f the universalist ethic o f a 
‘Eurocentric and Western cultural tradition’. In this sense, it raises new ques­
tions for debates on pluralism and point to the limits o f liberal democracy in 
dealing with and giving adequate status to difference.
The pluralists revival
The contemporary revival of pluralist theory can be seen from the number of 
publications in this field since the late 1980s (McLennan 1989; McClure 1992, 
Phillips 1993). As I have already argued, this renewal has to be placed in the 
context of debates on the limits of liberalism, or alternatively, in the context of 
its successful universalising and individualising ethic which, for multicultura­
lists, also constitutes the conditions of its failure.3
This contemporary interest in pluralism has tended to focus on and to reiterate 
the development of the pluralist tradition in its British, North American and 
European variants. Kirstie McClure, for example, has offered a rereading o f
2. Taylor ( 1992,68-9) points out that the claim being made by multi-culturalists is not only one 
for recognising the potential o f  all different cultures, but that it rather calls for a judgem ent 
o f  equal value in an a p rio ri  fashion. This is problematic, for w hile it is tenable to demand that 
we approach the study o f  different cultures with acertain presumption oftheir value, it cannot 
make sense to demand, as a matter o f  right, that we come up with a final concluding judgement 
that their value is great, or equal to others«.
3. In this respect, see also Parekh in Held (1992).
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the earlier pluralist traditions in terms of the question o f subjectivity and 
political agency, issues which are central to our theoretico-political concerns. 
She outlines three waves o f pluralist theory. The first and second are familiar 
versions. The first wave exemplified, inter alia in the works of Barker, Laski 
and Bentley, is articulated against unitary conceptions of state sovereignty and 
is thus critical o f the sovereign state as the centre of political life. The second 
wave, as found in the works o f Dahl and Truman, was closely linked to 
»empirical democratic theory«. Developed in opposition to sociological theo­
ries o f a »power elite«,4 it argued that political life consisted in the concatena­
tion of autonomous and competing groups rather than in the socio-economic 
sovereignty o f a dominant elite. The third wave, according to McClure, con­
sists of post-Marxist attempts to forge an interconnection between post-struc­
turalist critiques of identity and political theory, found, for example, in the 
works o f Laclau and Mouffe.5 To this can be added much of the contemporary 
theoretical debates informed by the conjunction between feminism and post­
structuralism.
These waves of pluralist theory, on McClure's reading, contain both similari­
ties and differences. All three variants are articulated in critical opposition to 
unitary and monolithic or totalising conceptions of the political domain (whether 
this totalising tendency is placed in the sovereign state or in a unique agency 
overseeing and determining the political process), and thus address issues of 
great concern to the contemporary debate on multi-culturalism and the politics 
o f difference more generally. All three variants also insist on the irreducible 
plurality o f the social, expressed in a multiplicity of social groups which have 
no necessary ontological grounding. Groups are seen, not as the expression of
4. Elite theorists, unlike pluralists, see power as concentrated in the hands o f  a few. Among 
classical elitists, Pareto emphasized the psychological basis o f  the dominant group within 
society, M osca highlighted socio-cultural factors, while M ichels stressed the organisational 
basis o f  the elite group (Marsh 1983,12). It is necessary to note that certain theorists who 
started out as pluraliste later m odified their positions to be more in accord with elite theories. 
Charles Lindblom, for example, argues that there are potentially a limited number o f  groups 
in society which enjoy a privileged position in relation to government. Indeed, to Lindblom 
in advanced capitalist societies one group, business, enjoys a unique position, essentially 
because o f  its structural position in the economy. This means, that unlike other groups, 
business has two means by which to influence governm ent- directly through interest groups, 
and indirectly through its structural position in the economy. This view differs from pluralism 
in two ways. It emphasizes the importance o f  a very limited number o f  groups and indeed 
singles out one group as being particularly important and capable o f  exercising a veto over 
government policy-making (Marsh 1983,13). This has led commentators like Marsh to re­
classify Lindblom as a elitist theorist o f  the »veto group« variety.
5. McClure (1992,114) also includes W alzerand other cultural pluraliste in this category, but 
argues that his work continues to circulate largely within the general problematic established 
by the preceding pluralist generations.
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natural kinds, but as contingently constituted political entities, making the 
social subject the site of multiple and intersecting group membership. Analysis 
starts in médias res, focusing on the constellation and character o f groups as 
they emerge.
The differences between these variants are traced to their respective construc­
tions of the relationship between the plurality of the social and political 
struggle (McClure 1992,116-120). The first generation o f pluraliste provided a 
means o f resituating the political in the midst o f the social by affirming the 
independence of group life from state determination, by disrupting the social 
atomism of liberalism and by demanding a rethinking o f citizenship and 
reinvesting labour struggles with political significance. (The latter proceeded 
through a rejection of the liberal conception of geographical numerical repre­
sentation in favour of occupation representation.) The second wave shifted the 
focus from the institutional context of the state to the terrain of the social itself 
by focusing on the contingent formation and expression o f group interests 
around specific issues. It abandoned the terrain o f political economy in favour 
o f a wider focus on associational life no longer purely delimited by economic 
considerations. Both thus opened up successively broader spaces for the politi­
cal expression of identities constructed within the plurality o f the social. Yet, 
these particularistic identities were recuperated in different ways into a col­
laborative relation to the state. In the case of the first wave, by using the 
discourse of political economy to distinguish between public and private 
groups, and in the second by funnelling the political claims o f all groups 
through institutional channels, addressing the state.
By contrast, the third wave of pluralist theorists focus, not upon the end-point 
of representations of »group interests«, but shifts attention to the political 
proper. That is, politics is no longer conceived as the projection o f group 
interests onto the screen of state policy, but precedes this in the processes of 
articulation through which such identities and representations are themselves 
contingently constructed. There is, therefore, an explicit focus on the process 
rather than simply the outcome of »interest articulation«. This move extends 
the terrain of political agency in several ways. It sustains the capacity o f the 
subject to make claims on behalf o f any, or any combination of, its multiple 
dimensions, and instead of directing demands exclusively on the state, politi­
cal contestation is expanded into the everyday enactment o f social practices 
and cultural representations, resisting recuperation into the unifying mecha­
nisms o f interest group politics (McClure 1992,123). Politics thus begins ‘not 
with the object of constructing similarities to address rights claims to the state, 
but opens rather with the object of addressing such claims to each other, and to 
each »other«, whoever and wherever they may be’ (McClure 1992,123).6
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This interesting re-reading of the tradition of pluralism, however, omits an­
other strand o f pluralist analysis: that developed with explicit reference to the 
»colonial« or »Third World«. This omission is particularly surprising in the 
context o f the politics of multi-culturalism which inaugurated the contempo­
rary recovery of pluralist politics. This tradition, I will argue, is especially 
relevant to our present concerns for, in contrast to the »interest«-based argu­
ments of the two traditions outlined above, the latter explicitly addresses 
questions o f identity formation.7
Recuperating the plural society thesis?
My primary thesis with regard to the theory of »plural societies«, albeit 
discredited for its excessive sociologism, is that it offers an interesting precur­
sor o f contemporary debates on multi-culturalism, which can only be ignored 
at our own peril. In contrast to the excessive emphasis on the consensual and 
integrative basis o f social orders found in the first two waves of pluralism 
discussed above, the pluralism characterised by the concept of »plural societ­
ies« —  a deeply problematic concept but one which I will nevertheless use as a 
shorthand for the theorists I am about to discuss — took as its startingpoint 
colonial societies characterised by deep structural divisions and conflicts.
The »conflict« model of plural societies derives from Furnivall who applied 
the concept to the analysis o f Burma and the Netherlands India. Furnivall 
argued that colonial domination imposed a Western superstructure of business 
and administration in a context o f cultural, social and racial diversity, and 
forced a union on the different sections of the population. In this situation, 
there existed no common social will -  also the focus of multi-cultural interven­
tions -  to hold the social order together. Furnivall elaborated the idea of a 
»medley« o f different cultural groups to characterise this situation:
It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each 
group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas 
and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the marketplace, in buying and
6. Arditi ( 1993,14) points to a problem with McClure's politics o f »mutual address«. He argues 
that politics cannot only consist in the »mutuality o f  address« between citizens, for that 
potentially ignores the institutional sites o f  politics, which remain important even if  w e work 
with apost-structuralist conception ofthe subject: a politics o f  horizontal address within civil 
society thus overlooks the dangers o f  social balkanization.
7. One o f  the few contemporary articles which does address this question -  with a focus on 
consociationalism  -  is that o f  Phillips (1993). She rightly emphasizes the distinction between 
the first two waves ofpluralism and the consociational tradition, as one between and emphasis 
on »interest politics« and a politics concerned with »identity«. However, she fails to point out 
the fundamental distinctions between the conception o f  identity utilised in the consociational 
tradition, and that o f  contemporary »identity politics«.
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selling. There is a plural society, with different sections o f the community 
living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit (Furnivall 
1956,304).
Integration is not voluntary, but imposed by the colonial power and the force 
of economic circumstance. Furnivall emphasises the prevalence of dissensus: 
there is a failure ofthe common or social will not only in the plural society as a 
whole, but also within each o fth e  plural sections which are atomised from 
communities with corporate life to crowds o f aggregated individuals (Kuper 
1969,11). Smith and Kuper extended Furnivall's initial analysis to all societ­
ies.8 Yet, their own analyses were still focused on colonial societies and their 
distinctive characteristics. Smith, in contrast to Furnivall, focused his attention 
the political form of plural society as one o f domination by one group, or more 
precisely, domination by a cultural minority. Cultural pluralism, defined solely 
in terms of institutional differences between cultural groupings, here is the 
major determinant of the structure o f plural society, and it imposes the neces­
sity for domination by one cultural section, thus excluding the possibility of 
consensus, or of institutional integration.9
Both Smith and Furnivall's respective analyses imply a distinction between 
two basic types of society, ‘integrated societies’ characterised by consensus 
and cultural homogeneity (or heterogeneity in the form of variations around a
8. Numerous attempts have been made to utilise pluralist categories for an analysis o f  South 
Africa (cf. Van den Berghe 1967, Kuper 1974, and Leftwich 1974). Both Kuper and Leftwich, 
for example, focus their analyses on the processes o f  colonisation through which corporate 
groups were incorporated differentially into the social order. This incorporation was depen­
dent on the unequal dispersion o f  power amongst the different racial groups, favouring the 
interests o f  white colonists. In their respective analyses, both Kuper and Leftwich draw 
attention to the complex relationships between econom ic and political power, race and class 
determinants. Both, in the final instance and follow ing the general trend o f  the pluralist 
tradition, see race as the organising principle o f  South African society (Howarth 1988,25). As 
Kuper argues:
‘Given the difficulties o f  class interpretations o f  plural societies, it may be more productive 
to take, as a basis for the analysis, the racial or ethnic structure, emphasising the mode o f  
differential incorporation.... From this perspective there is no reason to anticipate that class 
divisions would have a crucial overriding significance.... Colonial oppression or racial 
domination is experienced as a totality, and stimulates a racial, or national response, 
transcending class divisions’ (Kuper 1974, 224-5).
9. Smith (1969,440) later introduces a further set o f  pluralisms, namely social and structural 
pluralism. Social pluralism »is the condition in which institutional differentiations coincide  
with the corporate division o f  a given society into a series o f  sharply demarcated and virtually 
closed social sections or segments. Structural pluralism consists further in the differential 
incorporation o f  specified collectivities within a given society and corresponds with this in 
its form, scope and particulars«. Pluralist studies o f  the South African case have tended to 
employ the concept o f structural pluralism as a product o f  differential incorporation along 
racial lines (Howarth 1988,23).
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common basic institutional system), and ‘regulated societies’ characterised by 
dissensus and cultural pluralism (Kuper 1969,14). This distinction is further 
overdetermined by a difference in political form: liberal democracy on the one 
hand, and sectional domination on the other.
The problems with this division into »types« of society is obvious and the 
modernisation paradigm in terms of which it is articulated has been decisively 
criticised.101 will therefore not focus on this area of criticism. Before further 
discussing some relevant examples of this type of analysis, it is important to 
immediately signify one crucial problem with this model which emerges from 
our present considerations. This concerns the fact that, not only are the 
characterisation o f »plural societies« as deeply fragmented problematic, but 
the opposition established as such have come to be shown as untenable, for the 
mirror image of »deeply fragmented (colonial) societies«, namely the homog­
enous »Western« societies such as the United States, have been shown simi­
larly to lack the »integrative consensus«. To put it differently, the »integrative 
consensus« developed around universalistic individualist conceptions of citi­
zenship, has proved to be problematic in its very success of excluding particu­
laristic concerns from public political life.
More traditional critiques of the »plural society« analysis, concentrated on the 
problems of accounting for the existence of society in these accounts, and were 
developed from universalistic bases, whether this was the universalism of 
Marxist or of liberal analyses. Two different critiques, in addition to those 
already mentioned, has been made of the notion of »society« as utilised in this 
framework. Both concern the very possibility of society, albeit from very 
different perspectives. Basil Davidson (1969) and Ali Mazrui (1969), for 
example, put into question the concomitant use of the terms »society« and 
»plural«: in what way could these societies be both plural and societies? 
Indeed, if they are plural, can they be societies? Put differently, if the case of 
»plural societies« are characterised as extreme cases o f total identities, o f self- 
contained cultural systems where the contact between groups are minimal, 
how can one talk o f society or of any unity at all? In other words, these 
societies lack any means by which a larger solidarity or universality may be 
created and/or theorised. The second critique o f their use o f »society« is 
articulated from the perspective of the third wave pluralism. A fundamental 
theoretical and philosophical assumption made by most pluralists (and in this 
sense, the critique holds also for first and second wave pluralism) is that 
society presents itself as a valid object of analysis, an object with an a priori 
intelligibility and determined character. That is, society is regarded as strati­
fied in a particular way and has certain dominant characteristics around which
10. See in this respect Slater (1992) and Laclau (1977).
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analyses may be structured (Howarth 1988,27). It is clearly necessary to take 
on board this criticism, since its consequences are far-reaching: if society and 
modes o f social division are not given in an a priori fashion, then the focus of 
analysis has to shift toward the very production of those divisions, which may 
or may not be along cultural (racial or ethnic) lines.
This criticism also impacts directly on the cultural pluralists« conception of 
subjectivity. They assume the salience and givenness of cultural and racial 
divisions by drawing, for example, on Clifford Geertz’s concept o f »primordial 
sentiments« which constitute the particularity o f the plural communities, and 
which thus pre-exit their incorporation into »society« (Kuper 1969,472). This 
problem also extends to their inability to address conflicts and changes within 
»racial« groupings (Howarth 1988,26).11 One cannot therefore accept the very 
basis from which this analysis proceeds, namely the assumption o f an auto­
matic identity, rather than an identification with, respective cultures and or 
»races«. As was pointed out earlier with respect to the third wave pluralism, 
the construction of identities constitutes the political problem par excellence.
Having said this, the advantage of this type o f analysis is that it raises, against 
itself so to speak, the very question o f the political. Since the incorporation 
into a social order is not given a priori, it becomes the first o f problems to be 
addressed. However, this radical dimension is ultimately recuperated by the 
desire to achieve integration into the overall »developmental« nature o f the 
analysis. The problem for cultural pluralists remains one of how to think 
‘evolutionary [sic] change from cultural pluralism and divisive conflict to 
political pluralism and equilibrium’ (Kuper 1969a, 16). The model of a homog­
enous society in which pluralism becomes concomitant with a dispersion of 
power and a struggle between independent political parties and groups as 
associated with »Western liberal democracies«, remain their object o f desire. 
This object, however, as we know, has shown itself to be less than perfect and 
to raise anew the question of »incorporation« into a social order so starkly 
posed by the cultural pluralists.
Perhaps M.G. Smith's initial formulation of the universalism-particularism 
dimension of modes of incorporation may still be enlightening here. Smith 
( 1969,415f) puts it in the following terms: a distinction can be made between 
structures in which individuals are incorporated directly, on identical condi­
tions, as citizens, and structures in which they are incorporated indirectly, 
through their sectional identification, for example, as members o f an ethnic 
group. The former is described as a universalistic mode o f incorporation, 
while the latter may take two forms, either equivalential incorporation, where
11. Similar problems are to be found in the works o f  contemporary communitarian theorists.
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society is structured as an order of equivalent but exclusive corporate sections, 
and differential incorporation, where it is constituted as an order of structurally 
unequal, exclusive, corporate sections. (Smith equates differential incorpora­
tion as structural pluralism.) Indirect incorporation, both in its equivalential 
and differential forms, are particularistic since individuals are incorporated 
through their membership of sectional units. In these terms, contemporary 
multi-culturalist demands can be characterised as demands for equivalential 
incorporation within an already existing universalistic, democratic order.
This then brings us back to the other traditional critiques of the »plural 
society« version of pluralism. From a Marxist point of view, it has been argued 
that the particularistic focus as such is problematic. Legassick (1977,48), for 
example argues, that there is a ‘universal dependence of all producers on one 
another’, and that it is this universal aspect -  class -  that ought to take 
precedence in analysis of social division. Similarly, liberal commentators have 
been critical, then as they are now, of any mode of incorporation which 
appeals to particularistic identities. Indeed, for them the demand is simply 
misplaced. The impersonality of public institutions is the price we, as citizens, 
ought to be willing to pay for living in a society that treats us all as equals, 
regardless o f our particular ethnic, religious, racial or sexual identities (Gutman 
1992,4). Both these critiques remain, per definition, incapable of articulating 
the problem of particularism as raised in this version of pluralism. They simply 
legislate it out o f existence.
There is one further dimension of the question of »incorporation« which 
should be addressed before we move on to a discussion of a set o f particular 
cases. This concerns the dimension of force  argued to be essential to the 
constitution of forms o f unity in plural societies. Again, our response to this 
argument has to be ambiguous, for it is clear that this is not only a characteris­
tic of so-called deeply divided societies, but of society as such. The very 
conceptual separation between »force« and »consent« has to be problematised.12 
Nevertheless, if one takes it in a literal fashion, it is clear that the discussion of 
force here is related to the problem treated earlier, namely the impossibility of 
society. If there is an absolute absence of »common values« or a social will, 
then the only solution for the constitution of society, is it constitution by means
12. The strong distinction between force and consent can be problematised in so far as the 
establishment o f  any particular consensus always rules out other possibilities, and thus 
involves an element o f  force. This is at its clearest in conceptions o f society organised around 
the premise o f  the possibility o f  reaching a »total« consensus. In such a case, the very need 
for the freedom to take decisions would be eliminated. In that case we will no longer call such 
a society »free«. The relation between force and consent is thus one, not o f  mutual exclusion, 
but o f  mutual implication.
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of brute force.13 While Marxist and liberal accounts legislate particularism out 
of existence, cultural pluralism, on the other hand, remains unable to think the 
constitution of any form of universality, thus ending up with force as the only 
solution to the problem of the impossibility o f society. However, more con­
temporary versions of cultural pluralism have sought to overcome this problem 
by means of a set of »institutional fixes«. In this regard, it is interesting to look 
at the case of consociationalism.
Consociationalism and cultural pluralism
In the case of consociational theories, the coercive state is replaced by an 
institutional fix in the form of the development o f constitutional mechanisms 
which are to provide the unity -  »society« -  which otherwise remains an 
elusive object. At this point it may be useful to compare two historical cases, 
that of South Africa and the Netherlands. Pluralism, in the South African case, 
has been almost wholly identified with the version o f »plural (deeply divided) 
societies« discussed above, thus making it equivalent to »apartheid by other 
means«. Yet, if there is a relation between the recognition o f the plurality of 
the social, and form of democracy, it is necessary to find a way to re-introduce 
the discussion of pluralism without falling into the obvious problems so 
starkly shown in consociational models o f democracy.
Cultural pluralism, in its consociational form, started its career in South Africa 
in opposition to Westminster models o f »majoritarian« democracy.13 Lijphart, 
for example argued, and this was quickly taken up by the regime, that
... in divided societies, majoritarian democracy is totally immoral, inconsis­
tent with the primary meaning o f  democracy, and destructive o f  any prospect 
o f building a nation in which different peoples might live together in harmony 
(1977b,115).
Moreover, in the South African context, both the alternative solutions to the 
problem of society -  assimilation and partition -  was argued to be ‘impracti­
cal’ (but not immoral!). It was held that consociational democracy, o f which 
we still find strong traces in the present National Party constitutional propos-
13. The manner in which consociationalism was introduced into the South African political 
landscape is too complex to discuss here in full. Suffice it to say that since 1978, debates were 
characterised by discussions o f  the »plural« nature o f  South African society. Consociation  
was explicitly introduced in NP discourse during the late 1970s, and continued to inform -  
despite denials on their part -  the shaping o f th e  1983 constitutional model, based on 
»segmental authority« and a division between »own« and »common« affairs. This occurred 
in a context in which the nature o f  the segments them selves were rearticulated from a »volk«- 
based nationalism to one o f  a »multi-cultural« society in which there existed only »minori­
ties«. Fora fuller discussion o f  this, see Norval (1993,351-363); and Frankel (1980,473-94).
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als, gave us four crucial principles which could ensure »real« democracy: 
coalition government, a mutual veto, proportionality and autonomy of seg­
ments.14 (The latter provided for the maximum devolution of powers of 
decisionmaking, thus protecting the status quo.) While the preconditions for 
consociationalism as stipulated by Lijphart clearly did not hold for the South 
African case,15 Lijphart nevertheless propagated it as an ideal solution for the 
»problems« of South Africa. It was duly taken up, not only by the regime, but 
also by a number o f academics who claimed that consociationalism, with its 
‘recognition o f racial, ethnic or other sub-cultural differences’, and its empha­
sis on ‘elite pacting’ in order to transcend societal cleavages, was more than 
appropriate to address the problems of a deeply divided society such as South 
Africa.
Consociationalism in the South African case has been decisively discredited, 
and for obvious reasons.16 Most criticism, however, took one of two forms. It 
either focused on institutional and constitutional questions, such as the ab­
sence o f a role for a strong opposition in a model aiming at »consensus« 
politics, or it denied the very problematic around which this theory was 
articulated in the first place: the question of particularity in a democratic
14. It is important in this respect to note that consociationalism, for Lijphart, is not a specific 
institutional framework. Consociation is regarded as a form o f  decisionmaking within a 
democratic polity, and it thus can be made applicable within unitary, federal and other state 
forms. It is precisely in this sense that the recent NP constitutional proposals still display the 
deep traces o f  consociational forms o f  decisionmaking.
15. These aie:
»... a multiple balance o f  power among the segments o f  a plural society in which no segment 
has a majority and the segments are o f  approximately equal size; a relatively small population; 
external threats that are perceived as a common danger by the different segments; the presence 
o f  some society-wide loyalties, the absence o f  extreme socio-economic inequalities among 
the segm ents... and prior traditions o f  political accommodation that predispose the decision­
making by grand coalition method« (Lijphart 1977b, 124).
16. Critics o f  consociationalism in the South African situation have tended to focus on the 
follow ing problems: ( 1 ) the relation between »unifying« elite behaviour and political stability 
is questioned on the grounds that political stability is a result, rather than the cause o f  elite 
accommodation; (2) Brian Barry argues that elite accommodation is possible only where 
sectional differences are organisationally, rather than ethnically based; (3) South Africa lacks 
a tradition o f  elite accommodation, as well as o f  a unifying conception o f  an »external threat« 
(Venter 1982,286-7); (4) more radical critics also questioned, rightly, the very emphasis on 
elite politics at the expense o f  mass participation; (5) consociation can be used to control and 
prevent processes o f  radical change and to maintain the status quo (Frankel 1980,482); and 
(6) it has authoritarian implications, not only in its definition o f  executive powers, but also 
in its acceptance o f  the (then) existing statutory classification o f  the various »racial« 
population groups In fact, the South African political landscape not only lacks all the crucial 
requirements specified by Lijphart, but the traditions o f resistance also militates against the 
very conservative nature o f  the consociational model o f  politics.
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society. In the latter case, consociationalism was rejected as »apartheid by 
other means«, and rightly so. However, this critique also swept the problem  
under the carpet, for it provided a strictly universalistic answer to a particular­
istic demand. The relevance o f any form of division was denied, and the 
unitary status of South African »citizenship« (nationhood) was affirmed in the 
process. While this response may be understandable in the South African 
context, it nevertheless ignores the disputed relation between democracy and 
particularity, assuming democracy to be equivalent to strict universality.
At this point it has to be asked if the problems experienced in the South 
African case, is inherent in the consociational model or not? To put it differ­
ently, is the South African case once again to be read as one more example of 
an exceptional or unique nature, perverting the logics o f democracy as it had 
perverted the language of nationalism? Or does it show something inherent in 
the consociational model of democracy and pluralism, something which was 
not evident in its original conditions o f articulation? In this respect, it may be 
useful to compare it to the Dutch case, both in its historical development and in 
contemporary debates.
Historically, the pillarization (verzuiling) of the Dutch polity arose from an 
attempt to accommodate major religious differences via a vertical form of 
differentiation. Idealiter, each citizen found her position in specific voluntary 
organisations which belonged to her denomination (e.g. a Catholic or Calvinst 
trade union, youth organisation, educational system, and so forth), and every­
one was, according to this model, secluded in her »pillar«, and did not enter­
tain relationships with members o f other pillars (Berting 1993,2). At the top 
level of the political system a series o f rules had been worked out that implied 
a lot of autonomy for each pillar with respect to the organization of education, 
religious activities, and to a certain degree, labour relations (ibid.). In Lijphart's 
terms, this is a consociational democracy in which incorporation occurs along 
equivalential lines, thus recognising particularity in the very moment o f consti­
tuting an equal order. (It has to be pointed out that this arrangement was 
accompanied, and possibly made possible by a relative absence o f strong 
nationalist sentiments.)
A number of important remarks have to be made with respect to the very 
notion o f pillarization and its historical development. For our purposes, I 
would like to focus on the relation between »emancipation« and pillarization. 
It was through pillarization that catholic and neo-calvinist minorities acquired 
a power base in society, from where they began to integrate and to »emanci­
pate« themselves (Zijderveld 1993,23). Two more contemporary phenomena 
are o f importance in this respect: they are, the possibility o f de-pillarization on 
the one hand, and of renewed pillarization of minority groupings on the other.
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Historically Dutch society has experienced several attempts at de-pillarization, 
most notably an unsuccessful attempt just after the Second World War, and 
again during the 1960s. However, of more interest in the context of debates on 
multiculturalism and pluralism, is the possibility for additional pillarisation of 
sections of especially the immigrant population. Uitterhoeve (1990,33-5) dis­
cusses this possibility in the following terms:
Incidentally, it is quite possible that The Netherlands will witness an Islamic 
pillarisation in the near future, much comparable to the Catholic and Neo- 
Calvinist pillarization of yesteryear. As small as this »denomination« is at 
present, the Islam is in fact the second religion of the Netherlands now. !t is 
possible that the as of yet very small but quantitatively growing Islamic 
minority will follow the same route in its emancipation within Dutch society. 
... This Islamic mini-pillar ought to transcend ethnic differences, as there are 
Turkish, Moroccan, Moluk and Surinam, and (very few) Dutch muslims in the 
Netherlands.
Indeed, for Zijderveld (1993,32), this possibility o f renewed pillarization 
offers, not only an example of how the Dutch have come to organise their 
particular society. He envisages, not as a result o f some »‘liberal open- 
mindedness and longing for an easy-going harmony’, but ‘because there is no 
other way to survive collectively’, the possibility that the Dutch experience of 
pillarization may ‘function as a kind of model for societies that try to combine 
pluralism and democracy within a cultural context that is based upon and 
maybe even in the grips of many tension and conflicts, yet in the end remains 
always geared towards consensus and cooperation’. While this question obvi­
ously goes beyond what can be addressed here, the example does raise a set of 
important issues which I would like to address, however, briefly. In the first 
place, the conditions for renewed pillarizarion is obviously strongly linked to, 
not only the Dutch historical experience, but also to their marked traditional 
tolerance. Contextual factors ought thus to predominate in any discussion of 
this sort. Second, and more to the point, it has to be asked what sort of 
»emancipation«, and by implication, argument for pluralism, is at stake here? 
It seems, both from wider multicultural discussions, and from the case under 
discussion, that the subject to be emancipated is one embedded in her religion 
and/or culture. That is, we deal here with a situation in which a given identity, 
not identification, is at stake.
In that sense, and in spite o f its possible emancipatory effects and the explicit 
recognition that pillars can always change and be multiplied, I would argue 
that the multicultural pillarization is subject to exactly the problems identified 
earlier with the »cultural pluralists« of the plural society tradition. (It also 
displays the same problems that communitarians like MacIntyre has around
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the question of »tradition«.) Moreover, while certain »emancipatory« effects 
may follow, these remain caught within a tradition o f pluralism which does not 
recognise the multiplicity of subject positions, and therefore o f possible identi­
fications which may be exhibited by any one subject. To put it differently, 
while it goes some way towards addressing the problem of a recognition of 
particularity within a (consociational) democratic polity, it cannot negotiate 
the question of particularities in a satisfactory manner for it excludes the 
possibility of other and cross-cutting particularities from assuming more/equal 
significance.
Moreover, as a number of commentators have pointed out, it does not solve, or 
indeed even begin to address, the real problem at stake here:
Can people ... morally endure and politically afford it to continue to be 
»liberal«, »open-minded«, »anti-ethnocentric«, »culturallypluralistic«, »rela­
tivist ic« all the time? (Zijderveld 1993,31 )
This issue cannot be addressed from within the domain o f »pluralist politics« 
itself, for it raises the question o f the limits of pluralism itself.
The limits o f pluralist politics
A conception of the limits of pluralist politics points to two intimately related 
problems. As I have argued at the outset, a major problem with discussions of 
consociationalism is the tendency to provide »institutional fixes« for the 
problem of the »impossibility o f society«. That is, it tends to put forward 
procedural mechanisms for the creation and maintenance o f a »social will«, 
unified at least minimally around the »rules of the game«. As numerous critics 
have argued, consociationalism takes what is to be regarded as the outcome of 
such politics as its startingpoint. However, even more is at stake here. I would 
argue that a procedural focus presupposes some agreement on a democratic 
ethos, and cannot be argued to create such a consensus. Consociationalism, 
and by implication any approach which privileges procedures, is deeply flawed 
in that it fails to address its wider conditions o f possibility adequately and, in 
doing so, misunderstands the very nature and character of politics. Politics is 
not, as proceduralists would have it, simply a matter o f getting the right 
mechanisms in place. While these are important, and no democrat would deny 
that, the exclusive focus on procedures ignores the deeper need for the consti­
tution of an ethos of politics -  in this case a democratic ethos. Moreover, those 
who conceive of the pluralism of modern democracy as being total and as 
having as its only restriction an agreement on procedural rules, do not realize 
that there can never be pure, neutral procedures without reference to nonnative 
concerns (Mouffe 1992,12). To acknowledge this is to recognise that extreme
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forms o f pluralism, which emphasize and valorize all differences as equally 
valuable, are untenable within a democratic horizon.
The public recognition of difference and plurality -  demanded by both multi- 
culturalists and consociationalists -  is not in and of itself capable of producing 
more democratic settlements in our contemporary world. As the case of South 
Africa, as well as certain radical forms of multiculturalism clearly show, much 
depends on the precise political articulation of such demands. 1 have argued 
that some forms of contemporary multiculturalist arguments tend to display 
problems similar to that exhibited by earlier cultural pluralist. Put bluntly, the 
essentialisation of identity and the concomitant politico-cultural separatism 
does not seem to be the way forward towards a more democratic and plural 
liberalism.
As Kymlicka (1989) and others have argued, several problems remain to be 
addressed with regard to any form of »group« recognition in the public do­
main. The nature and constitution of the »group« raises issues concerning 
exclusivism and closure in identity, which may have anti-democratic conse­
quences on a number o f different levels. Moreover, it is unclear who is to 
decide which differences are the fundamental or important ones in the delimi­
tation o f such identities. These problems are but samples o f the kinds of 
questions that would have to be addressed in a pluralist democratic theory, and 
they are compounded if one emphasises a non-essentialist pluralism which 
takes the fluidity o f identity seriously. As I have pointed out earlier, nor can 
these problems be solved by a »procedural fix«, for the latter does not begin to 
address the issue o f criteria for the discrimination between differences. One 
cannot stand indifferent in the face of all differences, and one is therefore 
compelled to delimit the realm of plurality. Pluralism itself -  not even ofthe 
post-structuralist variety -  cannot provide one with the conceptual tools and 
guidelines to do so. A politics based on the mere pluralisation of differences 
does not take into account the fact that for any order to constitute itself, certain 
limits have to be drawn, and those limits are not given naturally. The condi­
tions of existence o f an object called society, and the construction of a social 
will, involves both the constitution of a domain of difference and the drawing 
of frontiers, delimiting what can be accepted within a particular order. It is 
here that pluralism reaches its limits, and it is also here that the need for a 
radical democratic pluralism needs to be asserted.
The development o f a democratic ethos, in this sense, has to start from the 
presumption o f the potential value o f all/other cultural practices and concep­
tions o f the good. However, as Taylor (1992,68-9) argues, it does not make 
sense to demand, in addition, an a priori positive valuation of such differences. 
Thus, while starting from an openness to the other, to difference as such, a
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democratic pluralism cannot assume that all others are o f necessity to be 
accorded equal status. If we are not to be led into a bad relativistic universe in 
which we no longer have the possibility o f discriminating between different 
forms of identification, the logics o f democracy, equality and liberty -  albeit in 
rearticulated form -  have to brought into play as principles guiding our 
political practices.
Moreover, the assertion of an »openness« to an other, in and of itself, is not 
unproblematic. Some theorists have argued that the mere recognition o f differ­
ence already involves a realisation of the contingency of all identity, and that 
this realization, without further ado, will lead to the taking o f a ‘reflective 
distance’ to one's own identity. It is thus not only the false universality of 
dominant forms of identification which are being put into question in this 
process, but also the valorisation o f the identity of subordinate and marginalised 
groups. Susan Bordo, for example, argues with respect to feminist critiques:
Where once the prime objects o f academic feminist critique were the 
phallocentric narratives of our male-dominated disciplines, now feminist criti­
cism has turned to its own narratives, finding them reductionist, totalizing, 
inadequately nuanced, valorising o f gender difference, unconsciously racist, 
and elitist (Bordo 1990:135).
The same argument has been presented in terms o f the problem o f multi­
culturalism and a futural politics of difference. The recognition o f one’s own 
finitude -  whether one belongs to a dominant or marginalised group -  provides 
the basis for a radically pluralist and democratic politics. This, however, is by 
no means a generally accepted position. Others have questioned the validity of 
such weakening o f identity, arguing that, just when marginal and oppressed 
groups are asserting their rights as political subjects is no time to deconstruct 
these identities. To do so would be to become complicit with an agenda which 
aims ‘to restrict both the scope of such rights claims and the potential power of 
those actively beginning to advance them ’ (McClure 1992,108). McClure, 
while begin critical of this reading, nevertheless does not give attention to the 
possible undemocratic consequences o f the assertion o f a post-modern »quo­
tidian« politics.
The issue at the heart of this contestation is the following: does the 
deconstruction of identity, the recognition of an essential openness to an other, 
in and of itself lead us to a more democratic politics? We need to proceed with 
some caution here, for the articulation and subversion o f any identity is an act 
of power, and power is unevenly distributed throughout society. The call for 
the weakening of marginal identities need to take this into account. As both 
Bordo and Phillips argue, to deny the difference between dominant and subor­
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dinate identities, is to fall back into the complacencies or the older pluralisms 
(Phillips 1993,159; Bordo 1990,149).
But perhaps this is to approach the question from the wrong side, for if certain 
trends in, inter alia, contemporary feminism as well as the renewed theorisation 
»racial« politics is to be taken as an example, it is not the case that there has 
been a reluctance to assert the multiplicity and complexity and ultimate open­
ness o f all identity. It is thus no longer a question as to whether marginal 
groups »ought« to take on board third wave pluralism and its concomitant 
conception o f subjectivity. Some have and will continue to do so, while others 
have nostalgically chosen to retreat into a politics of the enclave to ensure the 
recognition of their particular difference. Rather, the issue is and remains one 
of the subversion o f the surity and complacency of dominant discourses, for it 
is precisely these discourses which have refused this weakening of identity. In 
order to foster a politics of difference which will succeed in avoiding a futile 
separatism as well as in challenging dominant discourses, it is necessary that 
one does not remain on the terrain of the simple assertion of difference and 
particularity.
The recognition o f finitude, which underlies the openness to difference, is 
merely the point from which we have to begin to address anew the questions 
posed to us in the late twentieth century. Finitude, in this sense, points not to a 
mere pluralisation o f identities and o f particularities, but to the need constantly 
to renegotiate the difference between universality and particularity. To remain 
on the terrain of the latter, which has so decisively problematised the former, 
would be to open ourselves to a fundamentally undemocratic politics. Yet, the 
questioning o f forms o f universality by the emerging particularisms of our 
time, should not either lead to a simplistic reassertion of universality as such. It 
is only in the terrain o f the tension between the two -  in the terrain of finitude 
proper -  that we will be able to renegotiate, not only spaces for the democratic 
recognition o f particularity, but also for the revalorisation of quasi-transcen- 
dental universalisms from which an more egalitarian democratic project can 
arise. Avoiding the politics of the enclave while recognizing the salience of 
difference, constitutes the political question par excellence of our times. At 
stake here is the kind of politics that can recognize and legitimate difference 
while resisting fragmentation into discrete and local identities. No easy proce­
dures can be provided for the development o f this politics. There are no simple 
answers ready to hand. However, as Phillips argues, it is better to be without 
easy answers than to cling to ones that were wrong. What is clear, is that no 
answers will be forthcoming unless we engage with the construction of a 
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